There is (some) truth in that

Authors

  • Camillo Fiore

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34096/cf.n70.6502

Keywords:

formal semantics, truth predicate, paradoxes, logical expressions

Abstract

In this paper I present a formal treatment for the notion “there is (some) truth in that”. I adopt a first order language and assume a bivalued interpretation. I claim that “there is (some) truth in x” behaves as a partial and not transparent truth attribution. I argue that it should be modeled using a predicate rather than an operator. I introduce a predicate and consider three alternative criteria to characterize its semantics. I prove that, with any of the criteria, the predicate trivializes any classical theory that adopts a strong self-referential procedure. 

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Published

2018-02-02

Issue

Section

Discusión sobre Constantes lógicas (Eduardo Barrio, ed.)

How to Cite

There is (some) truth in that. (2018). Cuadernos De filosofía, 70, 57-67. https://doi.org/10.34096/cf.n70.6502